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by
ANNA MARIA NAWROT*
This paper is based on the application of the “Social World’s” theory created by  
Shibutani to the worlds of knowledge society, cyberspace, d-Knowledge Commons  
Ecosystem.1 Knowledge society will be presented as the social world and cyberspace  
as  the sub-social  world with the d-Knowledge Commons Ecosystem as the  sub-
world of cyberspace. This theory will open discussion about activity, boundaries,  
arenas and values of each social world/sub-worlds. However, the main intention of  
this paper is an introduction to a discussion about the sub-world of d-Knowledge  
Commons Ecosystem as an example of one of the most striking sub-worlds within  
cyberspace trying to answer the question: why do we need social worlds while talk-
ing about d-Knowledge Commons Ecosystem? This paper is to be divided into five  
parts: 1. Activity, 2. Boundaries, 3. Arena, 4. Values, 5. Conclusion.
* Anna Maria Nawrot obtained LLM degree from the University of Lodz (Poland), finished 
postgraduate studies in EU law and a postgraduate course in intellectual property rights at 
the University of Birmingham (UK); completed PhD thesis at the Centre of European 
Studies at the University of Gdansk (Poland) within the field of intellectual property rights; 
in 2006 PhD thesis defence; in 2007 PhD thesis awarded a price as the 2nd best in Poland 
according to Zakamycze Publications and Walters Kluwer; at present working on the 
communication aspects of intellectual property rights as well as the role of Human Rights 
and knowledge society for Knowledge Commons Ecosystem. Institution since 2007: Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University, Sweden; 
sponsored by the SI-Swedish Institute.Please direct all the e-mails to: anna_nawrot@onet.pl 
or anna.nawrot@rwi.lu.se Thank you.
1 The social worlds theory was created by T. Shibutani in 1955 and then developed by A. 
Strauss and H. Becker.
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ACTIVITY [1]
Social  worlds and sub-worlds themselves become the analytical  concepts 
used for the study of collective action. Shibutani focused on the idea of com-
mitment as the basis of social  action.  In this approach,  social  worlds are 
groups with shared commitments to the pursuit of a common task. They de-
velop ideologies  to define  their  work and moreover they accumulate  di-
verse resources needed to get the task done. Thus the “social world” is an 
interactive unit  that arises when a number of individuals strive to act in 
some collective way2. And this is knowledge society. Every “social world” 
needs the core activity to be established in order to exist. It could be argued 
that  the  most  striking  activity  for  knowledge  society  is  the  “creation  of 
knowledge”. However in the sub-world of knowledge society called cyber-
space it could be argued that “virtual” “connectedness to knowledge and 
information” could be perceived as primary activity. While in the d-Know-
ledge Commons Ecosystem, being the sub-world of Cyberspace, the most 
important one is “creation of digital knowledge commons”.
BOUNDARIES [2]
The notion of knowledge society as "social world” is used here to refer to a 
form of social organization which cannot be accurately delineated by territ-
orial, formal, or membership boundaries. There are no particular boundar-
ies, one could claim. The boundaries of social worlds/sub-worlds are highly 
fluid because they are determined by interaction and effective communica-
tion which transcend and cross over the more formal and traditional delin-
eators  of  organization.  Hence,  it  could be  argued that  the  most  striking 
“boundary” which distinguishes knowledge society as the social world is 
creativity.  Thereby  for  the  cyberspace  it  is  creativity  within  cyberspace 
which is  the boundary. While for the d-Knowledge Commons Ecosystem 
the boundary is  the notion of creativity within cyberspace “while  giving 
much but expecting so little” (Wikipedia slogans).
2 Kacperczyk, A., 2005, ‘Zastosowanie koncepcji społecznych światów w badaniach 
empirycznych’ in Konstruowanie jaźni i społeczeństwa. Europejskie warianty 
interakcjonizmu symbolicznego, ed. Hałas, E., Konecki, K.T., Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
Scholar, Warszawa.
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ARENA [3]
One of the most crucial notion developed for the “Social World’s” theory is 
called:  arena.  This  is  a  place  of  interaction and dispute  among different 
groups  of  interest  within  the  social  world  regarding  primary  problems, 
definitions of problems which occur there. It could be argued that there is 
the common arena existing for knowledge society, cyberspace and d-know-
ledge  commons  ecosystem  which  is  called  intellectual  property  rights 
(IPRs).
In the IPRs arena of knowledge society,  cyberspace and d-Knowledge 
Commons Ecosystem various actors from diverse backgrounds are seeking 
alternatives  for  over-expansion of intellectual  property.  Access  to Know-
ledge (A2K) initiative is one of the most striking examples. A2K is the initi-
ative presented in the draft entitled Treaty on Access to Knowledge which 
started in 2005 in Great Britain and has recently been a subject of discussion 
and  communication  within  the  cyberspace  by  the  University  of  Yale.3 
Among others4 there is one very important communication in the Preamble 
to this  draft  Treaty:  “Determined to create the broadest  opportunities  to 
participate in the development of knowledge resources (…).  Recognizing 
further the importance of knowledge resources that are created for the bene-
fit  of all, and the need to protect and expand the knowledge commons.” 
What are the motives of presenting this abovementioned communication by 
the knowledge society in the sub-world of cyberspace? The answer to this 
question is an attempt to name the self-correction mechanisms activated by 
the knowledge society like: open source and open content.
Open source idea is an example of  social  movement.  According to the 
rules  of  Copyleft  licensing5 users  of  a  computer  program  with  an  open 
source code may use this program, modify it, copy the program or any por-
tion of it, thus forming a work based on the program and distribute such 
modifications or work under the license terms. Therefore users learn from 
3 Specific information about the A2K Yale Project can be found at 
http://research.yale.edu/isp/index.html
4 Among others communicates the Preamble reads: “Sharing of the benefits of scientific 
advancement; determined to protect, preserve and enhance the public domain, which is 
essential for creativity and sustainable innovation; seeking to control anticompetitive 
practises; seeking to promote the transfer of technology to developing countries.”
5 For more information about free software licensing visit http://www.fsf.org.
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the program and are able to raise the level of the program and develop it. 
Hence in case of free software idea, the talk is about an active use of techno-
logy while in case of commercial computer programs we would rather speak 
about passive use of technology.  Open source movement (particularly the 
one of copyleft kind) in order to show the freedom idea is not emphasizing 
the ownership element so characteristic of IPRs. herefore it is about the real 
instrumentalization of copyright.6 Perhaps from the very first side it seems a 
bit contrary because copyright in open source movement is used not in order 
to protect ownership legally but in order to promote idea of free software, 
sharing knowledge.7 Therefore IPRs exist in copyleft and its existence has re-
ceived wide recognition in public licenses like GNU GPL.8
Open source idea is influencing other sectors of the market and the open 
content9 movement,  originating from the  United States  is  one of  the ex-
amples. It is meant as the initiative of „free creations and free contents” and 
is characterized by the will to „give the society a creation” meant as „re-
sponse and alternative action against the successive boosting and extension 
of the copyright protection”.10 The open content movement covers music 
collections, scientific papers collections, virtual libraries, visual and graphic 
items.  If  a  creation  made  available  is  accompanied  by  a  general  license 
agreement on free contents, such as Open Content License, Open Publica-
tion License.11 will be regarded as a test to check whether we are dealing 
with the open content movement.12
6 Barta, J., Markiewicz, R. 2005, Oprogramowanie open source, w świetle prawa. Między 
własnością a wolnością, Wydawnictwo Zakamycze, Kraków.
7 Linux is a proof of the success of open source movement also in Europe. Today one might 
observe that free software idea has became an alternative and competition for the 
commercial computer programs like Windows. Some of the companies (like IBM) decided 
“to make free” their patent portfolio for the open source idea which is an example of support 
for open source from commercial companies.
8 Lambert, P. 2001, ‘Copyleft, copyright and software IPRS: is contract still king’, E.I.P.R., vol. 
23, no. 4, pp.167.
9 Wiebe, A. 2006, ‘Open access and intellectual property in cyberspace’ in Legal, privacy and 
security issues in information technology, ed. Mercado Kierkegaard S., Institutt for 
rettsinformatikk, University of Oslo,Oslo.
10 Barta, J., Markiewicz, R. 2005, Oprogramowanie open source, w świetle prawa. Między 
własnością a wolnością, Wydawnictwo Zakamycze, Kraków.
11 The specific features of Open Content License, Open Publication License and Open Music  
License can be found at http://opencontent.org/opl.shtml, http://openmusic.linuxtag.org.
12 An earlier version of this part (starting from Arena [3]) of the article is available in the issue 
of MR Int. 2007 (Medien und Recht International) and was an integral part of the 
presentation during the “Lex Informatica” Conference (Vienna, July 2007).
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In the IPRs arena of knowledge society,  cyberspace and d-Knowledge 
Commons Ecosystem is also about seeking alternatives in IPRs as Human 
Rights for over-expansion of intellectual property.
Could IPRs pretend to be considered Human Rights? There is clearly a 
basis for such a claim in the international Human Rights instruments (ex-
amples: Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 
15 of The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 
According  to  Article  27  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
everyone has “the right to the protection of the moral and material interest 
resulting from scientific,  literally or artistic production of which he is the 
author”. However, in the same article it is also stated that “everyone has the 
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the 
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” Also Article 15 
of  The  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights 
comprise the rights of everyone to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the be-
nefits of scientific progress and its applications and, to benefit from the pro-
tection of the moral and the material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literally or artistic production of which he is the author. On the other hand, 
Article 15 requires States to make sure that everyone will be able “to benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”
Taking wordings of Article 27 and Article 15 under consideration it is ar-
gued that the rights of authors and creators should not only enable, but also 
facilitate  rather than constrain cultural participation and access  to know-
ledge. In this context it is possible to perceive this balancing of rights as in-
herently internal to IPRs as Human Rights.13 The balancing of rights appears 
in two situations. Firstly it may involve the narrow and private interest of 
authors and inventors on one side and wider and public interest of the soci-
ety as a whole on the other side (universal reach). Secondly, IPRs as Human 
Rights will also have to be seen in relation with other Human Rights.14
13 Torremans, P.L.C 2004, ‘Copyright As a Human Right’ in Copyright and Human Rights. 
Freedom of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy, ed. Torremans P.L.C., Kluwer Law 
International, Hague, London, New York.
14 Torremans, P.L.C 2004, ‘Copyright As a Human Right’ in Copyright and Human Rights. 
Freedom of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy, ed. Torremans P.L.C., Kluwer Law 
International, Hague, London, New York.
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Theorizing about IPRs as Human Rights would lead to the practicing 
part finding out exactly how this “first situation of balancing” works out on 
the  example  of  Eldred case.  The case  will  be  re-examined (as  the  “hard 
case”) with the application of the Alexy’s “Structure of Balancing”15 as the 
means of applying access to knowledge principle. Since balancing is based 
on the assumption that principles will never establish exactly what should 
be done or what must not be done (“optimization requirements”), it is ne-
cessary that principle of access to knowledge should be carried out to “the 
greatest extend possible”. In order to do it, it is necessary to contrast it with 
opposing principle such as protection of knowledge. In Eldred case open ac-
cess to books in the cyberspace library was dependent on the non-extension 
of the term of copyright protection by US Congress. When the US Congress 
passed  the  Sony  Bono Copyright  Term Extension  Act  (CTEA),  all  copy-
righted works were given additional twenty years of protection before they 
would enter the public domain. As the result, works that had been ready to 
enter the public domain in cyberspace were no longer available for publica-
tion and valuable literary and digital resource was taken out of public con-
trol. Eldred argued that continued congressional expansion of copyright in-
terfered with the constitutional  mandate that  copyrighted works only be 
protected for a limited time (according to Public Clause Congress is obliged 
to promote the development of science through the assurance of copyright 
for the definite period of time).16 This implies a conflict between two prin-
ciples: access to knowledge and protection of knowledge. In order to dis-
cuss the conflict according to “Structure of Balancing” three elements ought 
to be analyzed: Rule of Balancing, Weight Formula and Burden of Argu-
mentation.
According to the Rule of Balancing the establishment  of the “import-
ance”, “abstract weight” and “reliability” of the access to knowledge prin-
ciple and the protection of knowledge principle is required. While focusing 
on the “importance” of each principle it is relevant to establish whether the 
“importance” of access to knowledge principle justifies the detriment to, or 
non-satisfaction  of,  the  protection  of knowledge principle.  In this  way a 
commensurability  can  be  established  with  a  use  of  the  following  triadic 
15 Alexy, R. 2004, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
16 Lessig, L. 2005, Wolna kultura, WSiP, Warszawa.
-194-
A. M. Nawrot: Why Do We Need Social Worlds...
scale: “light” is 1, “moderate” is 2, “serious” is 4. The range of the import-
ance of these principles depends on normative and factual premises.  The 
normative premise concerns the “meaning” of the relevant positions of ac-
cess to knowledge principle and protection of knowledge principle from the 
“concept of person” viewpoint that the legal and political system must pre-
suppose.17 Thus, protection of knowledge should be given more weight in a 
liberal society. If an act of public power interferes with intellectual property 
rights, this results in a serious violation of the principle underlying them. 
However, while considering the concept of a person from the commons so-
ciety perspective access to knowledge principle is perceived as one of the 
most required.
As for the empirical premises, they concern what the measure in question 
means for the importance of both principles. From this point of view, the im-
portance of access to knowledge principle depends on the efficiency, speed, 
probability, reach and duration of the CTEA in failing to satisfy this principle 
at stake. The more efficient, fast, probable, powerful and long the CTEA is in 
failing to satisfy access to knowledge principle the greater the importance of 
this principle (4 for “serious”). The importance of protection of knowledge 
principle depends on the efficiency, speed, probability, reach and duration of 
the CTEA in satisfying this principle at stake. The more efficient, fast, prob-
able,  powerful  and  long  the  CTEA  is  satisfying  protection  of  knowledge 
principle the greater the importance of this principle (4 for “serious”). There-
fore, in Eldred case a hypothetical Court could consider that the degree of 
detriment to the protection of knowledge principle (principle 1) is serious as 
is the “importance” of the access to knowledge principle (principle 2).
The second element of the Rule of Balancing is “abstract weight”. This 
means finding out the “greater abstract weight”. Abstract weight is derived 
not only from the different legal hierarchies of the legal sources but also from 
the social values using the same triadic scale as previously. Thus, the meas-
urement of the “abstract weight” of principle of access to knowledge as well 
as the principle of protection of knowledge depends on the search for the 
best substantial theory of the constitution that the judge is to undertake. The 
judge will give the highest abstract weight to protection of knowledge and 
liberty if this  theory is  an individualistic  one. However,  if  the theory is a 
17 Pulido, C. B. 2007, The Rationality of Balancing, ARSP, vol. 92, pp.195-208.
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communitarian one,  the judge might  give the highest  weight  to  access to 
knowledge and to the common good. The hypothetical Court could consider 
that  in  Eldred  case  the  “abstract  weight”  of  protection  of  knowledge  is 
“moderate” (2) and that the access to knowledge principle is “serious” (4).
It is also relevant to establish “reliability” of access to knowledge prin-
ciple and protection of knowledge as the third element of the Rule of Balan-
cing.  It  concerns  the  reliability  of  empirical  assumptions.  It  answers  the 
question what the measure means for the non-realization of protection of 
knowledge principle (principle 1) and the realization of the access to know-
ledge principle (principle 2) in the Eldred case. This ought to be established 
with the help of the following scale: “reliable” is 1, “plausible” is ½ , “not 
evidently false” is ¼. The hypothetical Court could state that the “reliabil-
ity” is reliable in both principles.
In order to have a balancing outcome for the Eldred case, “importance”, 
“abstract weight” and “reliability” should be assessed. The tool for this is 
called the Weight Formula. According to this formula, the concrete weight, 
in Eldred case, of protection of knowledge principle (principle 1) in relation 
to  access  to  knowledge  principle  (principle  2)  results  from  the  quotient 
between, on the one hand, the product of the “importance” of principle 1 (4 
for “serious”), the “abstract weight” for this (2 for “moderate”), and the “re-
liability” of the empirical assumptions regarding that importance (1 for “re-
liable”), on the other hand, the product of the importance of access to know-
ledge principle (principle 2) (4 for “serious”), the “abstract weight” of this (4 
for “serious”), and the “reliability” of the empirical assumptions relating to 
that importance (1 for “reliable”).18 The concrete weight of principle 2 in re-
lation to principle  1 is  greater than the concrete weight  of principle  1 to 
principle 2, thus, Eldred case should be decided according to principle 2, 
namely access to knowledge.19
However,  in  2002,  Eric  Eldred  was  unsuccessful  in  rescinding  the 
twenty-year  extension to copyright,  but  the controversy surrounding the 
18 The third element of Alexy’s Structure of Balancing is the Burden of Argumentation. It 
refers to the situation when the weight of both principles is identical, which is not the case.
19 4 x 2 x 1 4 x 4 x 1   8   16 1
–––––––   ?   –––––––   ––  ?  –– ––  <  2
4 x 4 x 1 4 x 2 x 1   16   8 2
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CTEA, created the opportunity to re-think Eldred case.20 This could enter a 
key-discussion  whether  it  is  possible  to  indicate  equivalents  of 
“importance”, “abstract weight” and “reliability” in the Human Rights lan-
guage (would for example “proportionality” work for “importance”?). Then 
would it be possible to argue that all these wordings together (with Human 
Rights language) create a comprehensive “Commodious Equilibrium” for 
the judge to look at while ruling “hard cases” such as Eldred case.
VALUES [4]
According to social worlds theory, value is a kind of a special notion be-
cause  it  is  existing as a part of  certain “story” which is  essential  for the 
world/sub-world to exist (it is not a buzzword).21 Value is always a part of 
certain “commons” and the good of certain “commons” is always the main 
target and the main concern of social world/sub-world.
What are then the values of knowledge society, cyberspace and d-Know-
ledge  Commons  Ecosystem?  Saying  that  the  society  is  a  reflective  one 
means that a society is able to activate self-corrective mechanisms and re-
verse everything that is not a value for the community.22 The primary aim of 
the “reflectiveness”  feature is  to reverse the unfavourable  trends (e.g.  in 
law) in the society which are very often taken contrary to economic ratio.23 
These self-corrective mechanisms for the social world of knowledge society 
are Open Source and Open Content perceived as social movements. There-
fore “reflectiveness” seems to be the primary value of the social world of 
knowledge society.  The value  of  “reflective”  social  movements  has  been 
already communicated via Internet in the draft entitled Treaty on Access to 
Knowledge. This would mean that knowledge society development has a 
major influence on the modern concepts of justice „adding an entry” the 
communicated justice.24
20 Halbert, D.J 2005, Resisting Intellectual Property, Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group, 
London.
21 Kacperczyk, A., 2005, ‘Zastosowanie koncepcji społecznych światów w badaniach 
empirycznych’ in Konstruowanie jaźni i społeczeństwa. Europejskie warianty 
interakcjonizmu symbolicznego, ed. Hałas, E., Konecki, K.T., Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
Scholar, Warszawa.
22 Kołakowski, L. 1990, Cywilizacja na ławie oskarżonych, Res Publica, Warszawa.
23 Giddens, A. 2003, Stanowienie społeczeństwa, ,Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, Poznań.
24 Brodecki, Z., Nawrot, A.M. 2007, Świątynia w cyberkulturze. Technologie cyfrowe i prawo 
w społeczeństwie wiedzy, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk.
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While “reflectiveness” is a materia prima for the social world of know-
ledge society, program code is the one for cyberspace, since software is om-
nipresent in the cyberspace. Cyberspace derives its uniqueness neither from 
the data that are stored nor from the fact that we can exchange the data. It 
derives rather from the specific possibilities of the program codes such as 
for example program codes of TCP-IP.25 In the sub-social world of cyber-
space free code facilitates a great idea that software can be both used and re-
written by anyone. It could be also argued that code in cyberspace ought to 
be “free as in free speech”, which links the free exchange of ideas to the pro-
cess of software development. Taking under consideration the fact that law 
is not the only thing that regulates conduct and that there are other institu-
tions, one of the most striking ones is computer code.
Within the sub-world of d-knowledge society, IPRs perceived as Human 
Rights,  in the way they should not only enable,  but also facilitate  rather 
than constrain cultural participation and access to knowledge, could be con-
sidered as a value. However, how IPRs operate as Human Rights is to be 
observed through the art of balancing in cases such as Eldred.
CONCLUSION [5]
Why do we need social worlds while talking about d-Knowledge Commons 
Ecosystem in Cyberspace?
Firstly, employing a social worlds perspective to knowledge society, cy-
berspace and d-knowledge commons ecosystem is adequate because it al-
lows us to find out and understand that there is a very interactive, common 
arena of IPRs (for the worlds/sub-worlds of knowledge society, cyberspace 
and d-Knowledge Commons Ecosystem) which could be called: seeking al-
ternatives for the over-expansion of IPRs (the rights that are protected far 
too well).
Secondly, application of this theory provides us with common values for 
all the worlds/sub-worlds considered - and they are: reflectiveness, commu-
nicated justice, computer code, facilitation of access to knowledge through 
Human Rights as IPRs, balancing structure while considering cases.  That 
creates a common theme for the worlds/sub-worlds, which could be called 
25 Stocker, G. 2003, ‘Code-the Language of Our Time’ in Code – the Language of Our Time. 
Code=Law, Code=Art, Code=Life, ed. Cantz H. Ars Electronica, Linz.
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“a copy-Duty”.26 It has it roots in the problem of “accessibility” which center 
more on copy-RIGHT than on copy-DUTY. While in the knowledge society, 
cyberspace and particularly d-Knowledge Commons Ecosystem sub-world 
the problem ought to center Not on copy-RIGHT but on copy-DUTY which 
is the duty of owners of protected property by IPRs to make that property 
accessible.27 This “copy-DUTY” derives directly from IPRS as Human Rights.
And finally, employing a social worlds perspective to knowledge soci-
ety,  cyberspace  and  d-Knowledge  Commons  Ecosystem  is  adequate  be-
cause is allows us to realize how significant is to name values according to 
this theory, particularly while considering Alexy’s statement about values: 
“what under a system of values is prima facie the best, is under a system of 
principles what prima facie ought to be; and what under a system of values 
is  definitively the best,  is  under a system of principles  what definitively 
ought to be (...). Law is concerned with what ought to be. This counts in fa-
vour of the model of principles.”28
Cyberspace is perhaps already full of space and welcome for many social 
sub-worlds to grow, telling their own stories, focused on various ideas of 
commitment and creating different, best values and principles that prima 
facie ought to be.
26 Lessig, L. 2006, Code.Version2.0., Basic Books, Persus Books Group, New York.
27 Lessig, L. 2006, Code.Version2.0., Basic Books, Persus Books Group, New York.
28 Alexy, R. 2004, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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